Research Projects

Active research areas and projects at the Georgetown Security Lab.

The SecLab pursues research across several interconnected areas of computer security and privacy. Current projects are described below. Current and prospective students interested in any of these areas are encouraged to contact the affiliated faculty.

Censorship Circumvention & Traffic Obfuscation

We develop techniques that help users evade Internet censorship and traffic analysis by repressive adversaries. Our work spans covert channel design, protocol obfuscation, censorship-resistant proxy infrastructure, and detection of censorship circumvention in the wild.

NDSS 2026 Mirage: Private, Mobility-Based Routing for Censorship Evasion — Ratliff, Yang, Bai, Berger, Sherr, Mickens
USENIX 2025 Censorship Evasion with Unidentified Protocol Generation — Wails, Jansen, Johnson, Sherr
USENIX 2024 SpotProxy: Rediscovering the Cloud for Censorship Circumvention — Kon, Kamali, Pei, Barradas, Chen, Sherr, Yung
IEEE S&P 2024 NetShuffle: Circumventing Censorship with Shuffle Proxies at the Edge — Kon, Gattani, Saharia, Cao, Barradas, Chen, Sherr, Ujcich
NDSS 2024 On Precisely Detecting Censorship Circumvention in Real-World Networks — Wails, Sullivan, Sherr, Jansen Best Practical Award (FOCI)
FOCI 2023 Proteus: Programmable Protocols for Censorship Circumvention — Wails, Jansen, Johnson, Sherr
PETS 2022 Learning to Behave: Improving Covert Channel Security with Behavior-Based Designs — Wails et al.
DARPA RACE (RACECAR)
SecLab participants
  • Micah Sherr (PI)
  • Harel Berger
  • Ryan Wails
  • Dhiraj Saharia
  • Benjamin Ujcich

Security of Programmable Network Data Planes

Modern programmable network infrastructure (such as P4-based switches and SmartNICs) introduces new security challenges. We develop fuzzing tools and formal analysis techniques to discover bugs and vulnerabilities in programmable data planes, and investigate how P4 can also be used to improve network security capabilities.

IEEE S&P 2025 Chimera: Fuzzing P4 Network Infrastructure for Multi-Plane Bug Detection — Ujcich et al.
IEEE S&P 2024 NetShuffle: Circumventing Censorship with Shuffle Proxies at the Edge — Kon, Gattani, Saharia, Cao, Barradas, Chen, Sherr, Ujcich
NSF
SecLab participants
  • Benjamin Ujcich (PI)
  • Dhiraj Saharia

Security of Intent-Based Networking

Intent-based networking (IBN) promises to simplify network management by letting operators specify high-level goals rather than low-level configurations. We identify and analyze security vulnerabilities introduced by IBN architectures, including novel attack vectors in intent-flow state management, temporal vulnerabilities, and cross-layer security challenges.

SecDev 2025 Exploiting Intent-Flow State Vulnerabilities in Intent-Based Networking — Yan, Kim, Ujcich, Tian
ACM CCS 2024 Exploiting Temporal Vulnerabilities for Unauthorized Access in Intent-Based Networking — Weintraub, Kim, Tao, Nita-Rotaru, Okhravi, Tian, Ujcich
CACM 2024 Security Challenges of Intent-Based Networking — Kim, Okhravi, Tian, Ujcich
USENIX 2023 Intender: Fuzzing Intent-Based Networking with Intent-State Transition Guidance — Kim, Ujcich, Tian
NSF CAREER
SecLab participants
  • Benjamin Ujcich (PI)

Privacy-Preserving Statistics & Measurement

We develop cryptographic protocols that allow organizations to collect and analyze aggregate statistics about their users while providing strong privacy guarantees for individuals. Applications include privacy-preserving Tor measurement, distributed private set operations, and secure multiparty computation for network analytics.

PETS 2025 SCIF: Privacy-Preserving Statistics Collection with Input Validation and Full Security — Su, Bangalore, Berger, Yi, Castor, Venkitasubramaniam, Sherr
ACM TOPS 2022 Accountable Private Set Cardinality for Distributed Measurement — Fenske, Mani, Johnson, Sherr
ACM CCS 2017 Distributed Measurement with Private Set-Union Cardinality — Fenske, Mani, Johnson, Sherr
NSF
SecLab participants
  • Micah Sherr (PI)
  • Jianan Su
  • Harel Berger

Privacy & Security of Online Exam Proctoring

The widespread adoption of remote proctoring systems in education raises significant privacy and security concerns for students and educators. We study both the technical and human aspects: how students circumvent proctoring systems, how educators perceive and decide to use (or not use) these tools, and the policy implications for institutions.

ACM CCS 2024 "Modern Problems Require Modern Solutions": Community-Developed Techniques for Online Exam Proctoring Evasion — Simko, Hutchinson, Isaac, Fries, Sherr, Aviv
USENIX 2023 Educators' Perspectives of Using (or Not Using) Online Exam Proctoring — Balash, Fainchtein, Korkes, Grant, Sherr, Aviv
SOUPS 2021 Examining the Examiners: Students' Privacy and Security Perceptions of Online Proctoring Services — Balash, Kim, Shaibekova, Fainchtein, Sherr, Aviv
NSF
SecLab participants
  • Micah Sherr (co-PI, with Adam Aviv at GWU)

Mobility-Based Communication Protocols

We design and analyze communication systems that exploit human mobility patterns to create censorship-resistant messaging channels. When digital infrastructure is compromised or controlled, physical movement can serve as a communication medium. This project builds simulation tools, routing protocols, and privacy-preserving architectures for such delay-tolerant, mobility-based networks.

NDSS 2026 Mirage: Private, Mobility-Based Routing for Censorship Evasion — Ratliff, Yang, Bai, Berger, Sherr, Mickens
CSET 2023 Cadence: A Simulator for Human Movement-Based Communication Protocols — Berger, Sherr, Aviv
DARPA MARATHON
SecLab participants
  • Micah Sherr (PI)
  • Harel Berger

Usable Privacy & Social Media Trust

We study how users perceive and interact with privacy and security technologies in everyday online contexts. Recent work examines how changes to social media verification policies affect user trust in verified accounts, and explores how identity and credibility claims are understood online.

SOUPS 2024 "I Can Say I'm John Travolta... But I'm Not John Travolta": Investigating the Impact of Changes to Social Media Verification Policies on User Perceptions of Verified Accounts — Powers, Gravel, Pellegrini, Sherr, Mazurek, Votipka
SecLab participants
  • Micah Sherr